A view from the ground in Belem: Did COP30 deliver?

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Published on
15 December 2025
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5 minute(s) read

COP30 was historic in many ways. It was the first COP to be held in the Amazon and had the historic symbolism of marking the 10-year anniversary of the Paris Agreement. It also served as a litmus test for the world’s Net Zero trajectory considering it was the first time leaders officially admitted that we are extremely likely to overshoot the targeted 1.5 degree increase. This telling admission set the sobering and complex tone for the rest of the conference. Yet, despite this sombre backdrop, the underlying data reveals a more nuanced truth. Emissions are entering a plateau period compared to the years preceding the Paris Agreement, falling from growth of 1.7% per year (prior to Paris) to 0.3% now1.

During this COP the full complexities and contradictions of global climate diplomacy collided in one place.

The choice of location, Belem, was the first place where these complexities and contradictions materialised: lush rainforest meets deep social and economic inequality; and majestic rivers meeting overwhelmed and depleted infrastructures despite these logistical complexities, there was something profoundly symbolic about holding a COP in a place where climate change is not an abstract negotiation topic, but a lived experience.

So, what did COP30 deliver?

1. Fossil Fuels phase out - the climate battleground

Entering COP30, many held high hopes that a global roadmap to phase out fossil fuels would finally be agreed. More than 80 countries, from Germany to Kenya to Colombia, rallied behind this roadmap; however, the resistance was equally strong from countries such as Saudi Arabia, Russia, and various other major oil producers who blocked progress at every turn. In the end, disappointingly, the roadmap did not make it into the final UN text, making COP30 the first COP in history unable to add any fossil-fuel wording to existing texts.

However, an unexpected turn of events happened at the end of the conference, and another – more positive - ‘first’ occurred. COP30 became the first COP to push for parallel transition roadmaps outside the UNFCC2 as Brazil announced it would develop international roadmaps both for fossil fuel phase-out and deforestation. The implementation of this roadmap is already in place as both Colombia and the Netherlands announced they would co-host the inaugural ‘Global Fossil Fuel Phase-out Summit’ in 2026.

Verdict: COP didn’t deliver a UN-led roadmap, but a coalition of the willing is emerging and its actions might be bolder and implemented faster than the consensus-led system of COP.

2. Adaptation – the ‘piece de resistance’ of COP30

If COP28 was the ‘Fossil Fuel COP’, COP30 was the ‘Adaptation COP’. After years of being the neglected sibling of mitigation, COP30 finally changed this dynamic and put adaptation centre stage of climate diplomacy.

There were many key developments at COP30:

  • Creation of a new global adaptation framework, consisting of 59 indicators (including water access, health systems, resilient agriculture, climate information services, etc). Marking the first time adaptation has a measurable, and trackable global framework.
  • Pledge to triple adaptation finance by 2035. Current investments focused on adaptation are estimated to be ~$21bn3, or about 10% of the financing actually needed. Although tripling the financing by 2035 is incremental, it is nonetheless a symbolic and powerful step forward.
  • Commitments to accelerate National Adaptation Plans (NAP). COP30 facilitated operational guidance to support NAP implementation, including technical assistance, progress indicators and integration with broader climate finance systems. COP30 was the first time where NAPs were officially integrated in Nationally Determined Contribution (NDCs); with countries such as Brazil leading the way.
Verdict: While the financing gap on climate adaptation is vast, the pledge to financing and measurement is a huge step forward; and might be one of the most important legacies of COP30.

3. Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs): the gap between pledges and reality

COP30 was the third time countries submitted revised national government plans for emission reductions. NDCs were expected to dominate the headlines, and they did, but not for the right reasons, especially when it comes to the world’s largest three emitters:

  • China submitted a sober and underwhelming NDCs. Numbers were not revised up during COP despite high hopes
  • India failed to submit its NDCs before COP30
  • The US, unsurprisingly, neither attended COP30, nor submitted its NDCs; which is a continuation of President Trump’s climate agenda (or lack thereof).

Post COP30, the NDCs collectively amount to a 12% emission reduction by 2035 versus a 2019 baseline. This remains way below the expectations for Paris Agreement alignment. A ~50% emissions reduction is needed by 2035 for 1.5 ˚C alignment and a ~35% emissions reductions is needed for climate change to stay below 2˚C. The gap between pledges and reality highlighted the heavy influence of the current geopolitical climate on NDCs, especially in the context of an economic slowdown, tariff wars, energy security concerns and domestic elections.

Verdict: What COP30 didn’t deliver in terms of improvements of NDCs, it delivered in the sobering reality that NDCs have become a geopolitical artefact as much as climate plans.

4. Methane - the cow is still in the room

Methane reduction was expected to be one of the key breakthroughs of this COP, considering its huge potential in slowing down global warming in the next decade. Early signals were very promising: lots of goodwill pre-conference, China/UK/Brazil co-hosted ministerial roundtables on non-CO2 gases, the oil & Gas Decarbonisation Charter reiterated its ‘near net zero methane emissions’ by 2030 pledge, and there was momentum behind measurement and monitoring methane frameworks. While very encouraging, these measures fell very short of expectations regarding a) more binding requirements on the existing global methane pledge, b) the establishment enforcement mechanisms, or c) addressing emissions from agriculture; the latter being barely discussed during this COP.

Verdict: for methane emissions to be meaningfully reduced, both fossil fuel and agricultural systems need transformation. At COP30, it was very clear that despite progress, conversations around methane remain trapped between ambition and economic realities, especially for countries like Brazil.

5. Global trade - the new frontline of climate politics

One of COP30’s most notable, yet least reported, storylines was the rise of global trade as a climate battleground; and the EU’s Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) played a key role in it. With CBAM becoming operational in 2026, conversations shifted between the benefits of having a carbon price on high emitting goods, to industrial competitiveness, to accusations of ‘disguised protectionism’. The final texts included: a) a commitment to hold formal discussions on climate-related trade measures, b) a high-level review scheduled for 2028, c) warning against using climate policy as a trade barrier.

Verdict: COP30 certainly didn’t solve the equation of global trade and climate; but it unmistakably, and for the first time, put it at the forefront of climate diplomacy: the latter now moving beyond emissions metrics to industrial competitiveness, trade relations, and geopolitical influence.

The Paradox of COP

COP30 was chaotic, imperfect, occasionally dysfunctional, but absolutely essential.

If COP30 was to be judged solely from the lens of achieving a fossil-fuel phase out, then it certainly didn’t deliver in the way the world expected and neither did it provide any decisive breakthroughs.

But the reality is, COP agreements are about building global consensus and therefore, raising the collective bar, not leading the way. If we look beyond the grandiose declarations and sweeping pledges - Paris (COP21), Glasgow (COP26), or Dubai (COP28) - and the unglamourous mechanics of frameworks implementation, this COP might have achieved what others couldn’t. It bought to the table the sobering reality that climate plans are intrinsically linked to existing geopolitical and economic realities, that implementation is not as easy or straight forward as wishful thinking, and that climate negotiations are no longer stopping at the UNFCC doors.

1Energy and Climate Intelligence Unit: 10 Years Post Paris (December 2025).
2UNFCC: United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. It provides overarching frameworks for internal climate negotiations; which includes hosting and organising COP conferences and underpins climate agreements such as Paris Agreement or Kyoto Protocol.
3Bloomberg Data, 2025.

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