

Annual General Meeting (AGM) season was once renowned for shareholder revolts and management being held to account. In 2026, amid geopolitical tensions and economic fragmentation, the dynamic is shifting. Government-led interests are resurfacing and disrupting the traditional balance of power between management and shareholders.
The shift is most striking in the United States, where a political offensive against stakeholder capitalism, initially targeting companies’ diversity programmes, continues at pace. The 2025 AGM season already signalled a reduced role for shareholders, a trend set to be reinforced in 2026. Companies can now automatically default unvoted retail shareholder votes in favour of management, remove certain shareholder resolutions from the agenda, and limit investors’ ability to initiate collective legal actions.
While often framed as a transfer of power to management, the resulting increase in managerial autonomy is, in fact, illusory. The surge in national security and broader economic nationalism considerations has enabled more frequent and overt government involvement in corporate decisions. This shift became evident in 2025, notably through the introduction of a golden-share provision in the US Steel - Nippon Steel transaction, as well as political intervention around Intel, including public pressure on its leadership.
The resulting rebalancing reflects a shift from market-led governance toward increased state involvement in corporate decision-making. In 2026, this dynamic is already broadening to include strategic decisions and market operations, as illustrated by President Trump’s comments on the proposed Warner Bros acquisition.
In contrast, key Asian market are strengthening stakeholder roles, revealing underlying broader economic policy objectives.
Take the Value-Up reform launched by the South Korean government in 2025. Driven by the growing influence of retail investors (aka the electorate) this initiative has led to a series of improvements, including the landmark introduction of board directors with a fiduciary duty towards shareholders. After generating strong investor enthusiasm and contributing to the record rise of the KOSPI index in 2025, the 2026 AGM season was a first test of its implementation.
In Japan, stakeholder considerations are gaining importance in a context of persistent wage stagnation, with Prime Minister Takaichi calling on companies to better allocate their resources, including towards employees. The revision of the Corporate Governance Code, currently underway, is part of a broader evolution in the approach to governance, marked by a focus on capital allocation discipline and growth investments. Human capital is integrated within this framework.
Compared to the US and Asia, Europe’s governance trajectory is less clear-cut. As geopolitical pressures intensify, strategic autonomy and competitiveness have become more critical. This has triggered renewed state intervention, such as the Dutch government’s use of emergency powers to intervene in a domestic chipmaker and limit the influence of its Chinese parent. While such actions may increase in 2026, Europe is no stranger to government involvement with corporations.
What is more distinctive, however, is the persistence of unresolved tensions between competitiveness, regulatory frameworks and political objectives in a new world order. This will no doubt shape AGM season in Europe this year. This is particularly visible in the debate around corporate governance. Faced with higher US equity valuations and a rise in delistings, policymakers and market participants question whether governance standards can be a drag on market attractiveness.
In continental Europe, this is reflected in reforms such as Italy’s Capital Markets Act, which recalibrates the balance between investor protection and capital market dynamism. And even in the United Kingdom, historically regarded as the benchmark for corporate governance standards, signs of a shift are emerging. Following the 2024 reform of listing rules, calls for greater flexibility have intensified, with executive remuneration increasingly framed as a competitive disadvantage relative to US peers. Companies are beginning to test these boundaries. BP’s 2026 AGM provides a notable example. The company refused to include a shareholder resolution on the agenda requesting disclosure on its value-creation strategy in a scenario of declining oil and gas demand. An unprecedented move for a FTSE 100 company that drew notable dissent. This is particularly striking given BP’s prior positioning as a supporter of the energy transition.
Despite regional differences, a clear trend has emerged: corporate governance is being reshaped by political priorities. State influence is expanding even in economies historically committed to market primacy and the autonomy of private actors. Amidst this evolving balance of power, it is more important than ever for shareholders to use their voice this AGM season.
This is a marketing communication. This document is intended for professional clients.
This material may not be reproduced, in whole or in part, without prior authorisation from the Management Company. This material does not constitute a subscription offer, nor does it constitute investment advice. This material is not intended to provide, and should not be relied on for, accounting, legal or tax advice. This material has been provided to you for informational purposes only and may not be relied upon by you in evaluating the merits of investing in any securities or interests referred to herein or for any other purposes. The information contained in this material may be partial information and may be modified without prior notice. They are expressed as of the date of writing and are derived from proprietary and non-proprietary sources deemed by Carmignac to be reliable, are not necessarily all-inclusive and are not guaranteed as to accuracy. As such, no warranty of accuracy or reliability is given and no responsibility arising in any other way for errors and omissions (including responsibility to any person by reason of negligence) is accepted by Carmignac, its officers, employees, or agents. Reference to certain securities and financial instruments is for illustrative purposes to highlight stocks that are or have been included in the portfolios of Carmignac funds and is not intended to promote direct investment in those instruments, nor does it constitute a recommendation or investment advice. There is no guarantee that the securities mentioned will remain in the portfolio at any time in the future. The Management Company is not subject to prohibition on trading in these instruments prior to issuing any communication. The portfolios of Carmignac funds may change without previous notice. All investments must be made on the basis of the Fund's legal documentation only. The Funds’ prospectus, KIDs / KIIDs, NAV and annual reports are available at www.carmignac.com, or upon request to the Management Company. Investors have access to a summary of their rights in French, English, German, Dutch, Spanish, Italian at section 5 of "regulatory information page" on the following link: https://www.carmignac.com/en_US/regulatory-information. The Management Company can cease promotion in your country anytime.
UK: This document was prepared by Carmignac Gestion, Carmignac UK Ltd or Carmignac Gestion Luxembourg and is being distributed in the UK by Carmignac Gestion Luxembourg. Copyright: The data published in this presentation are the exclusive property of their owners, as mentioned on each page. “Carmignac” is a registered trademark. “Investing in your Interest” is a slogan associated with the Carmignac trademark.
CARMIGNAC GESTION 24, place Vendôme - F-75001 Paris - Tél : (+33) 01 42 86 53 35 Investment management company approved by the AMF Public limited company with share capital of € 13,500,000 - RCS Paris B 349 501 676.
CARMIGNAC GESTION Luxembourg - City Link - 7, rue de la Chapelle - L-1325 Luxembourg - Tel: (+352) 46 70 60 1 Subsidiary of Carmignac Gestion - Investment fund management company approved by the CSSF Public limited company with share capital of € 23,000,000 - RCS Luxembourg B 67 549.